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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In attempting to provide policy advice to judges, legislators, 
administrators, and other legal actors, law and economics 
scholarship pays close attention to the incentive effects that legal 
rules have on the citizens subject to them. This consequentialist 
focus on the effects of law means that law and economics scholarship 
requires a descriptive account of how people do (or will) react to 
various possible legal regimes. Traditionally, scholars in the field 
have relied on rational choice theory (RCT) for this account, although 
there has always been diversity in the precise vision of rational 
behavior that researchers assume. Some researchers assume that 
actors will seek to maximize their wealth, while others assume only 
that actors will seek to maximize their broader self-interest. Still 
others make no assumptions about “ends,” assuming only that actors 
will maximize their subjective expected utility, however defined.1 
Some researchers assume actors act on perfect information, while 
others assume that actors acquire information only to the point at 
which the marginal costs of acquisition exceed the marginal 
benefits.2 Despite the variations as to specifics, rationalist accounts 
of behavior are notable for assuming optimizing behavior on the part 
of actors.3  
 Perhaps as few as ten years ago, and certainly as few as fifteen, 
the notion that researchers should base their analyses on behavioral 
assumptions that are inconsistent with RCT—that is, that actors do 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor of Law, UCLA. Helpful comments from Iman Anabtawi, Steve Bain-
bridge, Tom Ulen, and participants of the Florida State University College of Law’s sympo-
sium on the Behavioral Analysis of Legal Institutions are gratefully acknowledged.  
 1. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sci-
ence: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
1051, 1060-66 (2000). 
 2. This strand of RCT thinking became widespread as a result of Stigler’s work. See 
George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).  
 3. Cf. Gerd Gigerenzer, Striking a Blow for Sanity in Theories of Rationality, in 
MODELS OF A MAN: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF HERBERT A. SIMON 389, 390-95 (Mie Augier & 
James G. March eds., 2004) (distinguishing theories of bounded rationality from theories of 
optimization under constraints).  
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not, at a minimum, maximize their expected utility given available 
information—was virtual heresy in the law and economics commu-
nity.4 This is not to say that law and economics scholars did not 
believe that people’s actions deviate at times from the optimization 
assumption of RCT; rather, that this aspect of reality was simply not 
useful for the purpose of devising legal policy because deviations 
were random and unpredictable, because competition would drive 
such errors out of legal markets, or because adding new elements to 
behavioral models would complicate analysis to the point that predic-
tion would become impossible.  
 Today, the approach to scholarly inquiry often called “behavioral 
law and economics,” which draws on the interdisciplinary behavioral-
decision-theory (BDT) literature for its behavioral assumptions, is 
recognized as an acceptable methodology, if not yet the dominant 
one, in the mainstream law and economics community. That is, most 
law and economics scholars would agree with the statement that 
citizens often behave in ways not predicted by RCT, and that taking 
into account the ways in which actors deviate in their 
decisionmaking behavior from the predictions of RCT can, in at least 
some instances, enrich our understanding of law-relevant behavior 
and improve the quality of normative legal policy prescriptions.  
 The general acceptance of the behavioral law and economics 
approach raises an important methodological question for law and 
economics scholars. For purposes of deriving policy recommenda-
tions, how should the researcher determine whether to assume strict 
RCT behavior or something more consistent with the BDT literature, 
such as bounded rationality or susceptibility to cognitive biases? 
Although most scholars now are willing to assume that strict 
rationality is neither ubiquitous nor always the most useful 
behavioral assumption for the purposes of crafting legal scholarship, 
this does not suggest that the opposite is true. That is, it is almost 
certainly the case that in many law-relevant situations, many actors 
evaluate information in a relatively unbiased way, make decisions 
that maximize their expected utility given available information, and 
implicitly measure utility in terms of their selfish interest. Notwith-
standing recent accusations to the contrary,5 most legal scholars who 
                                                                                                                    
 4. This generalization should not, of course, be interpreted as a claim that all law 
and economics scholars rejected non-RCT assumptions. Challenges to the optimization as-
sumption by interdisciplinary luminaries such as Herbert Simon and Oliver Williamson 
have long been well known, if mostly disregarded in practice, in the law and economics 
community. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. 
ECON. 99 (1955); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 
63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129 (1956); Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Some Ele-
mentary Considerations, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 316 (1973).  
 5. Compare Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should 
Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 
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identify with the behavioral law and economics movement would 
agree with this statement.  
 Professor Klick’s comment in this symposium issue,6 which 
responds to my previously published work on the subject of standard 
form contracts, implicitly provides two answers to this methodological 
question. The first response, which I think resonates quite clearly in 
Klick’s comment, can be paraphrased as follows: the scientific method 
should be used to determine whether an RCT-based or BDT-based 
assumption is empirically accurate in the law-relevant circumstances 
under consideration. The second response is that, until proven oth-
erwise, researchers should presume that citizens act in accordance 
with RCT. Admittedly, this latter response is less clearly implied by 
Klick than the former, but I think it is a fair reading of his article.  
 In this rejoinder to Klick, I argue that the first response is 
unobjectionable but often not helpful for the purposes of legal 
scholarship, and that the second response should be rejected. 
Instead, I propose that the choice between using an RCT-based 
behavioral assumption and a BDT-based behavioral assumption in 
law and economics analysis should turn on the relative plausibility of 
competing accounts in light of existing knowledge, which is often 
incomplete and indeterminate.  
 This Comment proceeds in three parts: Part II agrees with Klick 
that law and economics scholars should attempt to rely on the 
scientific method to understand law-relevant behavior but argues 
that, in practice, this goal will often prove elusive. Part III rejects 
Klick’s implication that RCT-based behavioral assumptions should 
be presumed true unless proven false—what I will call the 
“possibility” argument. Part IV proposes and defends the alternative 
methodological standard of relative “plausibility.” Part V concludes. 
II.   THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
 In a world of no transaction costs and perfect information-
processing capabilities among buyers, seller-drafted standard form 
contracts should include only efficient terms, meaning that no 
alternative set of terms would make buyers and sellers jointly better 
off.7 If the market is competitive, only sellers who offer efficient 
                                                                                                                    
(2002) (claiming that BDT proponents assert that actors always act inconsistently with 
RCT), with Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law 
and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1722 (2003) (calling Mitchell’s claim “a giant straw 
man”).  
 6. Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form Contracts: Price 
Discrimination vs. Behavioral Bias, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555 (2005).  
 7. For an excellent explication of this reasoning, see Richard Craswell, Passing on 
the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).  
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terms could succeed in attracting buyers.8 A monopolistic seller could 
offer inefficient terms without losing all of his customers, but he will 
maximize his profit in most cases by offering an efficient set of terms 
and charging a monopolistic price rather than by offering inefficient 
seller-preferred terms and a correspondingly lower price.9  
 Based on a BDT-based behavioral assumption derived from 
empirical research on consumer decisionmaking, I have argued that 
standard form contracts are likely to contain inefficient terms 
because most buyers will compare only a subset of product attributes 
(“salient” attributes) among sellers when making a purchase 
decision, even when all contract terms are readily available and, 
thus, RCT would suggest that buyers would implicitly price all of 
them as part of the purchase decision.10 Because making nonsalient 
attributes “low quality” will save the seller money and not cost the 
seller customers, sellers will have a profit incentive to skimp on 
quality for such attributes. If price is a salient attribute for buyers, 
sellers in a competitive market will actually be forced by market 
pressure to make nonsalient attributes low quality, whether or not 
this is the efficient level of quality for those attributes. This is 
because they will need the resulting cost savings in order to compete 
on price, which they must do to retain customers.11 Reputational 
costs will provide a counterweight to this tendency, but if buyers are 
unlikely to learn the true quality of a nonsalient attribute after 
making a purchase, this constraint is substantially weakened.12  
 Because form terms will often be nonsalient attributes to buyers, 
and because the content of such terms will become known to buyers 
only infrequently even after purchase (they usually become relevant 
only in the unusual case in which something goes wrong), sellers will 
often have an incentive to draft self-serving form terms without 
regard to efficiency.13 On the basis of this logic, I critique the current 
judicial attitude toward challenges to the enforceability of standard 
form contracts and present a normative argument for how legal 
doctrine can be adjusted to better promote contractual efficiency.14 
 Klick agrees, at least arguendo, that standard form contracts 
contain at least some inefficient terms,15 but he offers a competing 
                                                                                                                    
 8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8, at 116 (6th ed. 
2003).  
 9. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 7, at 372.  
 10. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1243-44 (2003).  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 1239-42. 
 13. Id. at 1243-44.  
 14. Id. at 1244-95. The particulars of my policy argument are not important for the 
purposes of this Comment.  
 15. Klick, supra note 6, at 556.  
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hypothesis for why this is the case. His hypothesis, which is 
consistent with an RCT-based set of behavioral assumptions, is that 
sellers provide inefficient terms (presumably inefficient terms that 
are favorable to sellers) to price discriminate among buyers.16 Buyers 
with a high value for time will rationally accept the form terms, 
giving a windfall to sellers.17 Buyers with a lower value for time will 
choose (rationally) to haggle over the inefficient and undesirable (to 
buyers) terms, at which point sellers will give ground to make the 
sale.18 By forcing buyers to separate themselves into two types, 
sellers will increase profits.19 
 The two behavioral hypotheses offered by Klick and myself might 
lead to very different policy implications. My theory suggests that 
efficiency in contracting could be enhanced if courts refuse to enforce 
form terms in some instances. Under Klick’s theory, it is less clear 
that state interference with form contract terms could enhance 
overall efficiency. This raises the question of which behavioral 
assumption we should rely upon—my BDT-based assumption or 
Klick’s RCT-based assumption—as the basis for further analysis of 
how the law should treat standard form contracts. Klick suggests 
that we ought to derive testable predictions from both assumptions, 
with particular focus on where the assumptions lead to different 
predictions, and then conduct research to determine which 
assumption receives empirical support in the real world.20  
 In theory, Klick’s proposal is eminently sensible, and I certainly 
support the widespread drumbeat for legal scholars to conduct more 
empirical analysis than our corner of the academy has produced 
historically.21 Yet the proposal also has a certain ivory-tower 
sensibility to it that fails to adequately account for an important 
practical difference between the purpose of legal scholarship and that 
of scholarly work in other disciplines. Legal scholarship seeks to 
provide policy guidance to lawmakers, and waiting for definitive 
empirical support for a behavioral assumption before action is taken 
                                                                                                                    
 16. Id. at 564.  
 17. Id. at 565-66. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 569 (“[E]mpirical testing is clearly important before we advance policy 
prescriptions regarding the treatment of standardized terms in the courts.”); id. at 561 
(stating that my behavioral theory should be tested empirically before the policy prescrip-
tions that follow are adopted).  
 21. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 
810-15; Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between 
the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 348-51 (1995); Richard A. Pos-
ner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1998); Peter H. Schuck, 
Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 333-35 
(1989). See generally Symposium, Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 789 (generally lauding empirical legal scholarship and encouraging more of it).  
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often equates with maintaining the status quo ante, whatever it may 
be, and on whatever behavioral assumption it may be based. The 
reality is that we rarely generate uncontestable empirical results 
relevant to important legal questions in any kind of a timely way.22 
While this is surely a goal worth striving for, it is not one that we are 
likely to attain all that often.  
 There are multiple reasons for this. The most obvious is that care-
ful empirical testing of law-relevant behavior in specifically defined 
settings is both time- and resource-intensive, and the list of topics 
that would benefit from such study is quite long compared to the list 
of scholars doing this work. Potentially even more troubling, how-
ever, is that the data required for such studies is often impossible (or 
virtually impossible) to obtain and, even when it can be obtained, the 
results themselves or the implications to be drawn from the results 
will often be contestable and ultimately indeterminate.23  
 Consider, for example, Klick’s claim that my behavioral model 
implies that inefficient, seller-preferred terms should be more likely 
to appear when consumers are “more homogenous” (because terms 
that are nonsalient to some customers, and therefore exploitable, will 
be nonsalient to most or all), while “the price discrimination model 
suggests that [such] terms are more likely when consumer 
heterogeneity is greater.”24 Imagine that a dedicated researcher 
relied on this statement as the basis for his efforts to conduct a test 
to determine which of the two theories is empirically justified. First, 
the researcher would have to develop methods for determining which 
terms found in form contracts are efficient and which are inefficient, 
for identifying all members of the customer class, and for measuring 
the heterogeneity of customers. I would like to be proven wrong, but I 
doubt that either Klick or I will be walking and talking, much less 
writing, when this feat is accomplished. The task is not theoretically 
impossible, but it would be quite difficult in practice. Second, the 
researcher would have to apply this methodology to many contracts 
in many industries in order to have enough statistical power to 
ensure that the test results are significant and to ensure that results 
are not idiosyncratic to, say, the widget industry. Third, the results 
would have to show a strong correlation—rather than a weak one—
between either heterogeneity or homogeneity of buyer preferences 
                                                                                                                    
 22. See Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and 
Pitfalls, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1033, 1036-37 (identifying fewer than thirty empirical studies 
specifically tied to arguments about contract law doctrine over a fifteen-year period). 
 23. See id. at 1056-61 (critiquing the usefulness of empirical studies to normative 
arguments about contract law); cf. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law Af-
ter Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 864-65 (2003) (arguing that eco-
nomic models are often indeterminate because we lack sufficient information about empiri-
cal conditions and it is unlikely that we will ever have better information).  
 24. Klick, supra note 6, at 568.  
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and inefficient form terms. This is possible, but obviously not 
guaranteed.  
 Finally, let us assume that the researcher determines that as 
heterogeneity in buyer preferences increases, the presence of 
inefficient, seller-preferred terms also increases. Should we then 
conclude that the price discrimination hypothesis has won the em-
pirical competition? I certainly do not think so, because there are ex-
planations consistent with my theory that would explain why sellers 
might provide inefficient form terms even if consumer preferences 
are heterogeneous. For example, it might be that within a heteroge-
neous buyer population there is a strong correlation between a 
certain preference type and the propensity to complain about seller 
performance or to file lawsuits. This could create an incentive for 
sellers to draft inefficient form terms that tend to be nonsalient to 
the desired (“profitable”) type of buyer and tend to be salient to the 
undesired (“unprofitable”) type of buyer, thus driving away the latter 
without deterring the former.25 In other words, a correlation between 
inefficient terms and buyer heterogeneity is not necessarily inconsis-
tent with my behavioral theory. 
 My goal is neither to take issue with Klick’s call for empirical 
testing of competing hypotheses, which is certainly a useful thing to 
do, nor to take issue with his suggestions concerning what particular 
empirical tests might make sense in this context. Rather, my claim is 
merely that lawmakers, and therefore legal scholars who wish to 
provide them with policy advice, often do not have the luxury of 
demanding clear, irrefutable, empirical proof of a behavioral 
assumption’s veracity in a particular law-relevant context, because 
such proof is likely to be a long time in coming and may never come 
at all. In the case of standard form contracts, I am skeptical that we 
will ever have empirical evidence that decisively vanquishes either 
Klick’s theory or mine. If I am correct about this, the obvious 
question is, how should law and economics scholars proceed?   
III.   A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY DEFAULT ASSUMPTION? 
 Regardless of how difficult it might be to conduct an empirical 
competition between my BDT-based behavioral assumption and 
Klick’s competing RCT-based assumption, two facts seem beyond 
argument: (1) no such competition has been conducted to date, and 
(2) notwithstanding this, courts and legislatures must deal with the 
fact of standard form contracts every day. Since the policy implica-
tions of the two behavioral assumptions are different (at least 
arguably), how should we determine which assumption to rely upon 
                                                                                                                    
 25. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1238-39.  
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for the purpose of advising legal policymakers?  
 As much as behavioral law and economics has become accepted 
as a research methodology, my sense is that, within the law and 
economics community, there is still a strong tendency to view RCT 
as the default set of behavioral assumptions. The primary 
manifestation of this is the emphasis among some law and 
economics scholars on “possibility stories.” Confronted with an 
explanation of behavior that appears inconsistent with usual RCT 
assumptions, the law and economics scholar contrives a narrative 
that explains the observed behavior in a way that is consistent 
with RCT.  
 For example, a first-order RCT prediction might be that popular 
restaurants with more demand than capacity would raise their prices 
so that the market will clear. Observing long lines outside of a 
popular restaurant, a law and economics scholar might offer the 
explanation that lines will create “buzz” for the restaurant, and that 
the expected increase in long-term profits as a result of the 
reputational capital the restaurant thereby creates will outweigh the 
short-term profits being sacrificed by holding prices below the 
market-clearing level. While inconsistent with the standard premise 
that price will rise when demand exceeds supply, this creative 
explanation harmonizes the empirical observation with RCT. The 
problem is not that the explanation is necessarily wrong; it is that 
RCT is sufficiently malleable that any mildly clever economist can 
conjure up a possibility story to explain virtually any empirical 
observation, so there is no a priori reason to assume that the 
explanation is right.  
 Klick’s paper is an example of such a possibility story. 
Confronted with my claim that inefficient form contract terms are 
the result of buyers’ limited cognitive resources, which causes 
them to limit the data that they analyze as part of their purchase 
decision, he presents an alternative hypothesis consistent with a 
RCT-based set of behavioral assumptions: Sellers use inefficient 
terms as a price discrimination technique that will maximize their 
profits.26  
 There is nothing inherently objectionable to responding to BDT-
based theories with RCT-based possibility stories. It is always 
sensible to consider multiple explanations for an observed outcome 
before assuming one is correct and proceeding to develop policy 
recommendations on the basis of it. But I think that there is more 
going on here than brainstorming. The implication of RCT-based 
possibility stories is that they serve to trump all but the most 
airtight BDT-based explanations. As Klick writes, law and 
                                                                                                                    
 26. Klick, supra note 6, at 564. 
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economics scholars 
should be careful not to invoke behavioral explanations—
developed atheoretically on the basis of observation as opposed to 
rigorous testing—simply because existing economic theory is not 
borne out empirically. Instead, we should adopt behavioral 
explanations only if they can explain systematic cross-sectional 
and time-series variation, while keeping in mind that conventional 
theory might provide some unexplored insights.27   
The subtext, I think, is that RCT assumptions should be the default 
standard, and that a possibility story consistent with RCT should be 
given preference over a BDT-based explanation unless and until the 
BDT-based theory is definitively proven beyond all doubt.  
 In his conclusion, Klick warns that “we need to be more hesitant 
in using insights from psychology to rationalize unexpected empirical 
observations ex post,”28 which again, I think, has the subtext that 
BDT-based explanations are entitled to citizenship in the law and 
economics nation, but only second-class citizenship. It is preferable to 
rationalize unexpected empirical observations with accounts that are 
consistent with RCT rather than with accounts that are not.  
 Although I might be reading more into Klick’s paper on this point 
than is actually there, I am quite sure that the default RCT pre-
sumption is held by many, if not most, law and economics scholars. 
The reason for this, I believe, is rooted in two core myths, neither of 
which is true: (1) RCT-based explanations of behavior are more par-
simonious than their BDT-based cousins,29 and (2) RCT-based 
explanations are better able to generate testable, falsifiable predic-
tions.30  
 Parsimony may be an aesthetic virtue for those inclined to 
mathematical modeling, but it has little virtue in a behavioral 
assumption that underlies a claim about what legal policy is most 
efficacious in a particular, well-defined context.31 If we wish to devise 
recommendations for how courts or legislatures should address 
standard form contracts, the best theory is the most accurate one, not 
the leanest. In any event, it is not necessarily the case that RCT-
based theories are more parsimonious than BDT-based theories. 
Klick’s theory assumes that buyers will implicitly price all form 
contract terms as part of their purchase decision (this is essential for 
                                                                                                                    
 27. Id. at 557-58 (emphasis added).  
 28. Id. at 569. 
 29. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1559-60 (1998).  
 30. See, e.g., Klick, supra note 6, at 557 (“[T]he comparative advantage of [non-behav-
ioral] economic analysis [is that it] generates testable hypotheses about cross-sectional and 
time-series variation in behavior.”).  
 31. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1072.  
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buyers to determine whether it is worth their time to bargain for 
better terms); my theory assumes that buyers will price only a subset 
of salient terms. It is true that my theory begs the question of how 
buyers will determine which terms are salient, and another layer of 
theory is needed to address this issue. But Klick’s theory begs the 
question of which terms sellers will use as vehicles for price 
discrimination, which the first cut of his theory does not specify. 
Klick’s theory also requires the assumptions that bargaining is costly 
and information acquisition is not costly, while my theory does not 
require any assumptions about the costs of bargaining or of 
information acquisition.  
 It is often claimed that RCT generates testable predictions ex ante, 
whereas BDT-based explanations are ad hoc, ex post explanations 
devoid of a theory that cannot generate determinate predictions.32 This 
charge is also grossly unfair. RCT generates a determinate set of 
predictions only in its thinnest form, and at this level the predictions 
are not testable. What I have called the “definitional” version33 of RCT 
predicts that individuals will act to maximize their subjective expected 
utility (SEU). The problem is that SEU cannot be observed, so the 
prediction is not testable. RCT adherents often infer from the actions 
an individual actually takes what actions maximize his SEU,34 but this 
sleight of hand reduces RCT to a tautology. To make RCT-based 
theories falsifiable, the theorist must make choices about a series of 
assumptions—choices that are ad hoc and ex post. Klick’s comment 
demonstrates this problem. If we assume low transaction and 
information acquisition costs, we would predict that terms in standard 
form contracts would always be efficient. If we assume that bargaining 
costs are high, as Klick’s theory implicitly does, sellers might use 
inefficient terms to price discriminate between buyers with high and 
low time values. But, then again, this prediction is consistent with 
RCT only if we implicitly assume that the benefit of price 
discrimination for sellers exceeds the costs to them of haggling with 
low-time-value buyers. If seller transaction costs are high, it is more 
likely that they will draft only efficient terms and not haggle.  
 In other words, RCT does not provide a determinate set of 
falsifiable behavioral predictions because RCT-based predictions 
always require assumptions about factors like individual utility 
functions, transaction costs, information acquisition costs, and the 
like. Law and economics scholars can (and do) create testable 
predictions by specifying these parameters, but if subsequent data is 
                                                                                                                    
 32. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 29, at 1559 (claiming that predictions as to what “ra-
tional man” would do in a situation are clear, whereas predictions of what “behavioral 
man” would do are not).  
 33. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1061-62.  
 34. See Klick, supra note 6, at 561 n.38.  
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inconsistent with the predictions, RCT is always flexible enough to 
allow the theorist to explain the results as consistent with RCT.  
 On close inspection, when a legal scholar needs to select a set of 
behavioral assumptions on which to build a normative analysis of 
legal policy, RCT lacks an obvious a priori advantage relative to 
BDT. To use a BDT term, only the existence of a status quo bias35 in 
the law and economics community—one that that can be overcome 
only with overwhelming evidence—can explain why RCT-based 
assumptions should be made the default preference of scholars.  
IV.   PLAUSIBILITY AND STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS 
 Rather than relying on possibility stories as a basis for assuming 
that citizens in law-relevant circumstances behave in accordance with 
RCT unless and until definitive evidence proves otherwise, I propose 
that law and economics scholars employ the following test for 
determining what behavioral assumptions to employ in legal policy 
analysis: choose the set of assumptions that is most plausible. By this, I 
mean that law and economics scholars should be pragmatic rather 
than doctrinaire in their choice of behavioral assumptions. We should 
take into account relevant empirical and experimental data (even 
when the data is not definitive), less rigorous armchair empiricism in 
the absence of data vetted by statistical analysis, and the logical 
implications of both of these data sources. We should then determine 
what set of behavioral assumptions is most likely to explain behavior 
in the context of interest to legal policy. That set of assumptions, 
whether it is more consistent with RCT or findings of BDT research, 
should then serve as the basis for deriving policy recommendations.  
 By accepting plausibility as a standard rather than demanding 
incontrovertible proof, I do not suggest that legal scholars should 
shrink from developing falsifiable hypotheses and testing them 
empirically. Rather, I merely recognize the reality that definitive 
proof will often be unavailable or indeterminate but that the law 
nonetheless must provide mechanisms by which citizens can order 
their affairs as best it can.  
 Turning to the issue of how the law should treat terms in stan-
dard form contracts, I contend that my behavioral theory outdis-
tances Klick’s in a plausibility competition and, therefore, should 
serve as the basis for policy analysis unless and until it is supplanted 
by an even more plausible theory. I believe that Klick’s theory, while 
possible, is quite implausible, and that the questions Klick raises 
concerning my theory do not undermine its plausibility.  
                                                                                                                    
 35. On the status quo bias, see William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo 
Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988); and Russell Korobkin, The 
Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998).  
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 The first hint that Klick’s theory is implausible comes from 
casual empiricism drawn from real-world experience. Most 
standard form contracts—at least in the consumer context on which 
both Klick and I focus our attention36—are adhesion contracts; that 
is, they are offered by sellers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.37 Klick’s 
price discrimination hypothesis implicitly assumes that sellers 
agree to redraft or otherwise supplant inefficient, seller-preferred 
form contract terms when buyers reveal that they are low-time-
value types. But in my experience, sellers rarely are willing to 
haggle over their form terms, no matter how patient the buyer 
might be. There are some exceptions to this rule, of course; for 
example, residential real estate contracts might be one. But in the 
great majority of form-contracting situations, the price 
discrimination theory is implausible.  
 The second problem with Klick’s hypothesis is that it fails to 
explain why market competition would not force sellers to offer 
buyers only efficient contracts. A buyer presented with a set of 
inefficient, pro-seller terms has two alternatives to accepting the 
offer: he can negotiate, as Klick’s approach assumes, but he also can 
shop elsewhere. Why will he not choose the latter option? This 
problem can be solved if we assume that shopping is more costly than 
bargaining, because this would mean that shopping is always 
dominated by the two alternative courses of action Klick considers. 
This move, however, leaves Klick’s theory reliant on two somewhat 
inconsistent assumptions: (1) buyers costlessly learn and understand 
the terms of one seller’s complicated form contract (this is necessary 
in order for them to determine whether it is worth their time to 
bargain for better terms); but (2) learning and understanding the 
terms of a second seller’s form contract is prohibitively costly.  
 Assuming that shopping is more costly than bargaining for buy-
ers, sellers effectively become monopolists, but this leads us to the 
third and most significant problem with Klick’s theory: in most cases, 
it is not in the interest of rational sellers to use inefficient, pro-seller 
terms as a price discrimination mechanism. If buyers optimize, as 
Klick’s theory assumes, monopolist sellers can maximize the differ-
ence between buyers’ willingness to pay (rather than bargain or exit 
the market) and the costs of production by providing efficient terms 
and a supracompetitive nominal price. This strategy maximizes the 
number of buyers who will accept the seller’s standard offer and 
minimizes the number of buyers who will bargain for a better deal.  
                                                                                                                    
 36. Klick’s hypothesis might be more plausible in business-to-business transactions, 
in which a seller’s standard form is more likely to be a starting point for bargaining than a 
nonnegotiable offer. 
 37. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1258.  
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 To bolster his theory, Klick describes a series of empirical 
examples of price discrimination activities conducted by sellers. Not 
coincidentally, however, in all of these examples the seller uses 
nominal price, rather than terms, as the discrimination mechanism.38 
For example, sellers differentiate buyer types by offering lower prices 
in outlet malls that take more time for buyers to reach than other 
stores and by offering lower prices to buyers who invest time in 
clipping coupons.39 It might make sense to price discriminate with 
terms under some specific conditions, but the hypothesis is 
implausible generally because rational sellers usually would use 
nominal price rather than terms to price discriminate.40  
 Klick raises two challenges to the plausibility of my theory that 
buyer bounded rationality causes profit-maximizing sellers to seed 
standard form contracts with seller-preferred nonsalient terms, 
whether or not these are efficient. First, Klick criticizes an 
apparent inconsistency in the theory: buyers are assumed to be 
boundedly rational and, as a result, fail to act in a way that 
maximizes expected utility, while sellers are assumed to be fully 
rational profit maximizers.41 In fact, my theory does not assume 
that seller rationality is less “bounded” than buyer rationality,42 
only that sellers have access to feedback mechanisms that buyers 
do not have (a point Klick concedes).43 No doubt, sellers will often 
fail to draft the optimal set of contract terms. But, in a competitive 
market, sellers who fail to provide the profit-maximizing set of 
contract terms will not be able to compete effectively on price and 
will lose customers. This market feedback will give them both the 
information and the incentive to adjust their terms.44 Buyers lack 
this degree of feedback and incentive. Most buyers will never know 
whether a standard form contract to which they are a party 
contains inefficient terms because they lack access to counterfactual 
contracts that are economically feasible, and there are no 
evolutionary pressures that will drive buyers who happen to accept 
inefficient terms “out of the market” over time.  
                                                                                                                    
 38. Klick, supra note 6, at 565 (citing Raymond Chiang & Chester S. Spatt, Imperfect 
Price Discrimination and Welfare, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 155 (1982)).  
 39. Id.  
 40. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1211-12 (providing a more complete explanation); 
see also Craswell, supra note 7, at 372; R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s 
Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 635, 638 (1996); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in 
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bar-
gaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 607-08 (1982); Posner, supra note 23, at 843; George L. 
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1321 (1981).  
 41. Klick, supra note 6, at 561.  
 42. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1289.  
 43. Klick, supra note 6, at 561-62. 
 44. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1219 n.53.  
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 Second, Klick suggests that form terms that are at one point in 
time nonsalient to a buyer will become salient when a low-probability 
event occurs (such as a product failure that leads to a dispute), which 
effectively forces the buyer to become more familiar with the 
contract’s fine print, in turn suggesting that sellers’ incentives to 
draft inefficient pro-seller terms will be constrained by reputational 
consequences.45 I agree with Klick’s point—that is, I believe that fear 
of the reputational costs associated with angry buyers will mitigate 
the market incentive sellers face to draft pro-seller terms whether or 
not they are efficient—but I do not believe that this point is 
inconsistent with the theory I propose. Although reputational costs 
mitigate sellers’ incentives, they do not completely eliminate them. 
Because form contracts usually become relevant only when a low-
probability event occurs, there is no reason to believe nonsalient 
terms will become salient to most buyers. In addition, there is likely 
to be an adverse selection problem: If buyers who complain about the 
seller’s wares—and, in so doing, have occasion to become aware of 
the contents of the form terms—are less profitable to sellers than 
other buyers (because they are the type of buyers more likely to seek 
refunds, repairs or replacements, litigate, and so on), sellers might 
have an additional incentive to draft abusive terms in an effort to 
avoid the future business of this troublesome customer group.46 
 As briefly described above, my argument is based on the following 
(abbreviated) chain of reasoning:  
 (1) empirical evidence suggests that buyers will implicitly price 
only a subset of product attributes when making purchase 
decisions;  
  (2) contract terms are product attributes;  
  (3) contract terms will often be “nonsalient” (that is, not priced);  
 (4) sellers will face market pressure to skimp on nonsalient 
atributes, whether or not this is efficient, in order to have more 
resources to expend on making salient attributes attractive (such 
as keeping prices low);  
 (5) one-sided terms will become salient to some buyers with 
experience, thus mitigating this incentive, but not to most, thus 
not eliminating the incentive.47  
 There is no empirical data relevant to parts (2) through (5) of this 
reasoning. But this should not be the test of the theory’s acceptance. 
The appropriate question is whether my account is more plausible 
than the alternatives, such as the traditional RCT account that 
cognitive capabilities are infinite so market pressure ensures all form 
                                                                                                                    
 45. Klick, supra note 6, at 562.  
 46. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1240-41.  
 47. See id. passim.  
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contract terms are efficient or Klick’s theory that sellers use 
inefficient, pro-seller terms as a price discrimination tool. The most 
plausible account should be used as the behavioral basis for debates 
on how the law should treat standard form contracts.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The core insights of law and economics analysis, in my opinion, 
are that people respond to incentives, that the law can thus affect 
behavior, and that, therefore, law has efficiency as well as distribu-
tive consequences.48 None of these core insights are conditioned on 
the assumption that citizens subject to the law always act in a way 
that is consistent with RCT. Law and economics analysis requires 
assumptions about behavior, but they need not be RCT assumptions.  
 The effectiveness of legal policy prescriptions depends on the 
accuracy of the behavioral assumptions that underlie them, which 
means we should use scientific methods to test our behavioral 
assumptions concerning law-relevant circumstances whenever 
possible. But the law must act; it cannot wait for empirical certainty. 
So, in many—perhaps most—cases, our touchstone must be 
plausibility.  
                                                                                                                    
 48. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1054.  
 
